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Abstract 
Metaphor in language is the manifestation of metaphorical 
thinking. Although metaphor has been studied from 
different perspectives with different focuses, systematic 
researches on metaphor have seldom been conducted from 
the angle of metaphorical thinking. Approaching from 
the perspective of thinking, this paper aims to elaborate 
the cognitive mechanism of metaphor and claims that 
comparison cognition generates metaphorical thinking 
which is a dynamic process consisting of some cognitive 
links that constitute an organic whole. 
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INTRODUCTION
In the studies of metaphor different perspectives have 
been adopted. From rhetoric perspective, metaphor is 
often assumed as one kind of tropes which are more 
or less ornamental devices used in the rhetorical style. 
This position holds that metaphor is an ornament which 
can beautify language like making language concise, 
vivid, humorous, impressive, etc.. From traditional 
semantic perspective, metaphor is regarded as semantic 
controversion or deviance of normal language. This 
viewpoint argues that metaphor differs from ordinary 
language in that a literal reading of a metaphor produces 
a false statement or violates the semantic rules. As far 
as pragmatic perspective is concerned, Searle (1979) 
emphasizes that the problem of metaphor concerns the 
relations between word and sentence meaning, on the 
one hand, and speaker’s meaning or utterance meaning, 
on the other. He asserts that metaphorical meaning is 
always speaker’s utterance meaning. According to him, 
when we hear someone say “Sally is a pig”, we know 
that the speaker does not mean what he says literally, 
and instead he is speaking metaphorically. Morgan 
(1979) expresses that he endorses Searle’s opinion that 
metaphor can only be understood by close attention to 
the distinction between sentence meaning and utterance 
meaning. Metaphor is also studied from a cognitive 
perspective. Black (1979) treats metaphors as cognitive 
instruments, which provide new angles for us to observe 
the world. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) proclaim that 
metaphor is a matter of thought and action and only 
derivatively a matter of language. In their opinion, 
our language is metaphorically structured and human 
thought processes are largely metaphorical. Lakoff 
(2009) contends that metaphor is a normal, and mostly 
unconscious, mechanism of thought. Actually, metaphor 
itself is not a mechanism of thought. Metaphorical 
expressions in language can mirror the way of thinking 
or conceptualizing things on the grounds that they leave 
a lot of traces of thinking for us to detect. Through 
metaphor, we can discover the truth of metaphorical 
thinking. But what is the metaphorical thinking behind 
metaphor? About this question, little research has been 
done from a comprehensive angle. Although a lot of 
studies of metaphor have been carried out, different 
theories on the nature of metaphor have different 
focuses. Therefore, this paper attempts to deal with 
metaphorical thinking from a systematic perspective, 
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trying to grasp the essence of metaphorical thinking 
through the appearance of metaphor.
1.  REEVALUATION OF THE THEORIES 
ON METAPHOR
1.1  Traditional Views 
Human interest in metaphor has undergone a long 
history. Among the traditional theories on metaphor, 
the most representative two are the comparison theory 
and the substitution theory. Aristotle is the source of the 
comparison view of metaphor (Glucksberg & Keysar, 
1993, p.422) and he most valued metaphor based on 
analogy because he regarded analogy as important for 
reasoning (Kittay, 1990, p.3). According to Aristotle’s 
view, metaphor involves an analogy or similarity between 
two or more objects. But in Aristotle’s framework of 
rhetoric, metaphor is mainly treated as a special lexical 
means for achieving rhetorical effect. In the 1st century, 
Quintilian put forth the theory of substitution which 
takes metaphor as the substitution of one metaphoric 
expression for one literal expression with the same sense. 
For example, in “Tom is a lion”, the word “lion” is used 
in place of its equivalent literal expression “a courageous 
man”. 
Traditional theories have attached much importance 
to the rhetorical and ornamental functions of metaphor, 
but some cognitive elements can be found in traditional 
theories. Aristotle has realized there exists some relation 
between metaphor and comparison, especially has 
sensed the important role of similarity and analogy in 
metaphor. Although the substitution theory fails to give an 
explanation of how to substitute, the substitution link may 
be necessary, that is, after a series of correlated thinking 
activities which lead to the generation of metaphor, we 
will use the known or familiar to substitute the unknown 
or unfamiliar. In fact, this substitution is a result of 
conceptual integration, not the simple substitution between 
two words or two expressions. From the above discussion 
we can see that in the process of metaphorical thinking 
at least the following cognitive elements are included, 
such as comparing, finding similarity, analogizing and 
substituting. 
1.2  Interaction Theory
The treatment of metaphor at the level of lexis went 
unchallenged until the 1930s when Richards proposed the 
interaction theory which is considered to be a transition 
stage from traditional to cognition. For Richards (1936), 
when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of 
different things active together and supported by a single 
word, or phase, whose meaning is a resultant of their 
interaction. Richards suggests that metaphor is not just 
a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, 
rather, it is the by-product of human thought process. 
“Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, 
and the metaphors of language derive therefrom.” 
(Richards, 1936, p.94)  Richards failed to elaborate how 
the interaction worked, but he confirmed the role of 
comparison in metaphor. Black (1979) developed the 
interaction theory on the assumption that we needn’t have 
to know the similarities of the two distinct subjects, i.e. 
a principal subject (tenor) and a subsidiary one (vehicle), 
before metaphorical understanding and that similarities 
can be created via the interaction of the two subjects. The 
systems of the subsidiary subject and the principal subject 
interact with each other in the metaphorical understanding. 
During this process, the related commonplaces of the 
subsidiary subject organize and select the features of the 
principal subject system. According to Black’s interaction 
view of metaphor, the metaphorical meaning results from 
a projection of features of the source (or vehicle) domain 
onto the target (or tenor) domain. 
To sum up, Richards’s and Blacks’ interaction view 
breaks away from the traditional treatment of metaphor 
as a lexical deviation. This theory tells us metaphorical 
thinking is a dynamic process in which, according to 
Black, the thinking links of selection and projection 
should be included, that is, the metaphorical meaning 
results from the selection of features of the source domain 
and projection of the features of the source (vehicle) 
domain onto the target (tenor) domain. In the interaction 
theory, metaphor is no longer only a means of decoration, 
but a process of thinking. Since Richards, metaphorical 
study has begun its cognitive turning. And this theory lays 
a firm foundation for the followers of the cognitive view 
on metaphor. 
1.3  Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics
The cognitive nature of metaphor had not been further 
explored until the conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) 
was established by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and not 
comparatively fully perfected until the blending theory 
(BT) was proposed by Fauconnier & Turner (1996, 1998, 
2002). The conceptual theory argues that conceptual 
metaphors are systematic mappings across conceptual 
domains: one domain of experience, the source domain, 
is mapped onto another domain of experience, the target 
domain. The source domain is typically more physical 
or concrete than the target domain. All in all, a metaphor 
is a mapping of the structure of a source domain onto a 
target domain. In the blending theory, conceptual blending 
involves the temporary construction of simple cognitive 
models and the establishment of cognitive mappings 
between different mental spaces. The typical conceptual 
blending model consists of two input spaces structured 
by information from discrete cognitive domains, an 
optional generic or schematic space built by the abstract 
relational schemas common to input spaces, and a 
blended space that is an emergent structure containing 
selected aspects of structure from other spaces. Blending 
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involves the establishment of partial mappings between 
cognitive models in different spaces, and the projection of 
conceptual structure from space to space.
CMT and BT share many features with each other, 
as Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999) put it: Both 
approaches treat metaphor as a conceptual rather than a 
purely linguistic phenomenon; both involve systematic 
projection of language, imagery and inferential structure 
between conceptual domains (mental spaces); both 
propose constraints on this projection. CMT and BT 
explain the complex and inextricable relationship between 
thought and language, having interpreted the process in 
which we can see how metaphor is produced and how 
meaning is constructed, but BT is more persuasive. As we 
know, mapping in CMT is unidirectional from the source 
domain to the target domain, and there is no interaction 
in a real sense. From the interaction theory, we know that 
metaphorical thinking is a dynamic process in which the 
metaphorical meaning results from selection of features 
of the source domain and projection of the features of 
the source domain onto the target domain. Although 
CMT emphasizes the projection or mapping function, 
it is only a thinking link of the metaphorical thinking. 
Another failure in CMT is mapping simply occurs in the 
two-domain model, while BT allows for two or more 
mental spaces and in BT the mapping is multidirectional 
in that projection can happen from the input spaces to the 
blend. In the blending process, connections are first made 
between corresponding elements in the separate input 
spaces. After the establishment of connections, a generic 
space appears which contains what the inputs have in 
common (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p.41). The final 
step in the blending process is to transfer the common 
information into the blended space. This space is the 
final output and it contains generic structure captured in 
the generic space. As the blend inherits partial structure 
from each input space, it develops emergent content of its 
own, which results from the integration of elements from 
the inputs. From BT, we can infer that the conceptual 
blending model is a powerful cognitive system which 
offers a better account for the production of metaphor. 
The model provides us with a dynamic picture: mappings 
in the typical four mental spaces are multidirectional; 
connections are built up between the two input spaces; 
similarities between the two input spaces are abstracted 
into the generic space, and then all the information are 
blended in the blend space and finally into an output 
space. All the spaces interact with each other and the 
interaction is really realized; in this cognitive model, the 
blending link is the most important and prominent in 
producing metaphor.
Based on the above analysis, we can see that the 
generation of metaphor is a dynamic cognitive process in 
which at least the following thinking links are included: 
Comparison, the establishment of association between 
two different things or concepts from different cognitive 
domains by finding similarities or creating similarities, 
interaction (mapping or projection) among different 
domains, blending, and these links are closely knitted with 
one another, of which we cannot lopsidedly emphasize 
any one and neglect the role of the other ones, and they 
constitute an organic whole.
2.  COMPARISON COGNITION
2.1  Ubiquity of Comparison 
According to the New Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary 
(2007), the meaning of “compare” is to estimate, 
measure, or note the similarity or dissimilarity between. 
It originates from Old French comparer, from Latin 
comparare, from compar ‘like, equal’, from com- ‘with’ 
+ par ‘equal’; “com-”: with; together; jointly; altogether; 
“comparison” originates from Middle English, from Old 
French comparesoun, from Latin comparatio(n-), from 
comparare ‘to pair, match’; “analogize”: To make a 
comparison of (something) with something else to assist 
understanding; “contrast”: To compare in such a way as 
to emphasize difference. From the above interpretations, 
we can see that if things are to be compared, they need to 
be first jointed together or juxtaposed, otherwise, likeness, 
equal, and difference cannot be found; both “analogize” 
and “contrast” are born out of “comparison”.
  In Chinese, coincidentally, there is a Chinese 
character “比(bi)”which can match the English word 
“compare”. “比(bi)” is an associative compound1, 
as is shown in Picture 1, the left character is its form 
inscribed on animal bones or tortoise shells in the Shang 
Dynasty(16thBC-11th BC), the middle one carved on 
ancient bronze objects, and the right used in Chinese seal 
cutting. 
Figure 1 
Ancient Writing Forms of Chinese Character “比(bi)”
The two parts of “比(bi)” indicate that two persons 
stand close together, or two persons stand side by side, 
stretching out their arms and legs as if to compare 
the size. Just because of “standing close together”, 
“close/closeness”, “intimate/intimacy”, “juxtapose/
1 In the light of A New Century Chinese–English Dictionary (2004), 
associative compound is one of the six categories of Chinese 
characters under which Chinese characters are constituted; a 
character-formation method in which two characters are combined to 
form a new character, or two meanings are blended to create a new 
meaning, e.g.日(sun) and 月(moon) are combined to form 明(bright/
brightness),which is related to light, opposed to 暗(dark/darkness).
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juxtaposition”, “like”, and “equal” are often considered to 
be the original meanings of “比(bi)”. Then, the meanings 
of “比(bi)” are extended to “compare/comparison”, 
“analogize/analogy”, and “contrast”. Chinese character 
“比(bi)” has the same usage as the English word 
“compare”, but presents the meaning of  “compare” more 
vividly.
Comparison cognition is pervasive in our life and 
of great importance. The processes of comparison and 
mapping are central to all forms of human inference 
(Burstein, 1986; Collins, 1978; Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Collins & Michalski, 1989), comparison underlies 
categorization (Smith & Medin, 1981), analogies and 
metaphor are also heavily dependent on the processes 
of comparison and mapping. From the above remarks, 
we know that comparison plays a significant role in 
cognition, but we often treat comparison and mapping 
as two discrete things without noticing that mapping 
is part of the whole comparison cognition. Langacker 
(1987) regards comparison as a ubiquitous phenomenon 
that occurs simultaneously in different domains and at 
different level of cognitive complexity. Langacker (1987) 
contends that the ability to effect comparisons underlies 
the detection of regularity and the imposition of structure 
on cognitive activity, without comparison, semantic 
analysis concerning conceptualization, mental experience, 
and cognitive processing cannot go on. Thought is mostly 
unconscious (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.3), cognitive 
functioning is largely autonomous (Langacker, 1987, 
p.112). Thus, often we neglect thinking of “比(bi)/
comparison” itself.
2.2  The Cognitive Mechanism of Comparison 
In the thinking of “比(bi)/comparison” itself, we 
frequently deal with it as an indivisible whole. But it is 
an analyzable organic whole composed of some cognitive 
links. Langacker (1987) divides comparison into some 
parts such as establishment of correspondences between 
distinct entities, scanning, selection, abstraction, and 
recall. Actually, comparison cognition is a dynamic 
process consisting of closely knitted cognitive links like 
setting the comparison standard or cognitive reference 
point, juxtaposing two or more entities, establishing 
correspondences between two or more things, finding 
vantage point, scanning, within-domain mapping or cross-
domain mapping, and blending. 
As Figure 2 shows, Oval A represents the source 
domain, standing for comparison standard（S）or 
cognitive reference point；Oval B is target domain 
(T). According  to  the conceptual  space  theory of 
Figure 2  
Model of Comparison Cognition
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Gärdenfors (2004, 2011, 2014)2, Oval A and B can 
also be considered as two conceptual spaces. In 
Gärdenfors’ opinion, information is organized by quality 
dimensions that are sorted into domains like space, time, 
temperature, weight, color, shape; domains are endowed 
with a topology or metric; the dimensions form the 
framework to assign properties to objects and to specify 
relations between them. Gärdenfors (2011) argues that 
a natural property is a convex region in some domain, 
and a concept is represented as a set of convex regions 
in a number of domains, together with information about 
how the regions in different domains are correlated. 
Gärdenfors（2011） takes “apple” as an example to 
explicate the concept of “apple”, as Table 1 presents:
Table 1
The Concept of Apple
Domain Region
Color Red-yellow-orange
Shape Roundish
Texture Smooth
Taste Regions of the sweet and sour dimensions
Nutrition Values of sugar content, fibre content, vitamins, etc..
Fruit Specification of seed structure, fleshiness, peel type, etc..
For Gärdenfors (2011), a conceptual space is a 
collection of quality dimensions divided into domains, 
but the dimensions of a conceptual space are not fully 
independent entities, they are correlated in various ways 
because the properties of those objects modeled in the 
space co-vary, for example, in the fruit domain, the 
ripeness and color dimensions co-vary; Concepts are 
not just bundles of properties, they are also correlations 
between regions from different domains that are 
associated with the concept. In Table 1, the “apple” 
concept has a strong positive correlation between 
sweetness in the taste domain and sugar content in the 
nutrition domain, and a weaker positive correlation 
between redness and sweetness. From Gärdenfors’ 
conceptual space theory, we know that a conceptual 
space is not only a set of quality dimensions but also a 
collection of properties and correlations. On one hand, 
in a conceptual space, the properties may differ from one 
another or correlate with one another; on the other hand, 
the collection of quality dimensions and properties in a 
conceptual space determines its difference from other 
conceptual spaces. Meanwhile, the quality dimensions 
2 A conceptual space is built up from geometrical representations 
based on a number of quality dimensions, and the primary function 
of the quality dimensions is to represent various qualities of objects, 
they correspond to the different ways stimuli are judged to be 
similar or different, for example, one can judge tones by their pitch, 
and that will generate a certain ordering of the auditory perceptions 
(Gärdenfors, 2004, pp.10-11 ).
and properties of a conceptual space can correspond 
and relate to the ones in another conceptual space. 
This is the reason why we can find the difference 
and correlation in and between things, and also the 
prerequisite of comparison cognition. In Figure 2, the 
black dots of Oval A and B represent the sets of all 
kinds of properties and relations in the two conceptual 
spaces. Through comparison, one or more points can 
be found which correspond to one another in the two 
conceptual spaces. These points can be considered 
as vantage points, which can mirror the angles from 
which people treat things (shown by virtue of the 
black dots in Oval C). Comparison juxtaposes S and 
T, in the process of which, a medium is often needed 
to join them together. The medium in comparative 
constructions can be encoded into a comparison mark. 
For example, in the Chinese sentence “我比他高”, “比
(bi)” itself is a comparison mark. And in its English 
equivalent “I am taller than him”, “than” can be treated 
as a comparison mark with the role similar to Chinese 
“比”. In the process of juxtaposition, correspondences 
are established, then, the selection of vantage point is 
involved, as Oval C shows. Comparison is a dynamic 
process, where the vantage point is also a vector along 
which there is in some sense a scanning movement 
from S to T or T to S. In the movement, mapping may 
happen, that is, in the process of comparison, in identity/
sameness/similarity judgment, mapping will work, but 
in difference judgment, mapping cannot be successfully 
completed. In Figure 2, the horizontal double-headed 
arrows designate corresponding, scanning and mapping. 
Based on the above mentioned cognitive links, a 
blending space comes into being (shown in Oval D). 
The blending is built up on the vantage points which 
are the prerequisite of blending, presented by the 
hollow vertical double-headed arrows in Figure 2. And 
the resultants of blending are the findings of identity, 
sameness, similarity, difference, etc.. In the course of 
comparison, by finding identity, sameness, similarity, 
metaphor can be produced.
2.3  The Functions of Comparison Cognition
We frequently compare the experience we are currently 
having to memories of earlier episodes, this cognitive 
capability shows that we can judge, consciously or not, 
various relations among our experiences (Gärdenfors, 
2004, p.4). In particular, we can tell how identical 
or similar a new phenomenon to an old one, or how 
different the current experience is from what we 
have already encountered. We often interpret a novel 
experience with reference to previous experience, which 
Langacker (1987) relates to the inherent asymmetry 
between standard and target in acts of comparison. He 
holds that the previous experience can be an immediately 
preceding cognitive event; since the occurrence of 
an event leaves a temporary trace that facilitates its 
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repetition, one event naturally tends to be adopted as a 
standard for evaluating a directly subsequent one; the 
previous experience can also take the form of a well-
entrenched routine activated for the structuring of 
current sensations. Our proclivity for interpreting new 
experience by means of previous experience is such 
that it is difficult for us not to notice the identity, the 
sameness, the similarity, the difference among things. 
But how can we find these characteristics among things? 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) write:
The recognition of identity, sameness, equivalence, A=A, which 
is taken for granted in form approaches, is in fact a spectacular 
product of complex, imaginative, unconscious work. Identity 
and opposition, sameness and difference, are apprehensible in 
consciousness and so have provided a natural beginning place 
for formal approaches. But identity and opposition are finished 
products to consciousness after elaborate work; they are not 
primitive starting points, cognitively, neurobiologically, or even 
evolutionarily. 
From the above comments, Fauconnier & Turner 
have noticed that finding identity and opposition, 
sameness and difference, similarity and dissimilarity 
among things is not the primitive starting points and 
behind it there must be backstage cognition which plays 
a great part. But what is the backstage cognition here? 
It is comparison cognition―a way of meta-cognition 
that provides prime power for analogical reasoning, 
categorization, metaphorical thought, conceptual blend, 
etc.. 
Comparison is a medium by which the world is 
universally connected because it can join two or more 
irrelated things together to establish correlations between 
them. Actually, comparison cognition is not only a way 
of thinking which is generalized and ubiquitous but also a 
pervasive psychological and social phenomenon. We live 
by comparison. Through comparison, we can find identity 
and opposition, sameness and difference, similarity and 
dissimilarity, etc.. But all of these relations are two sides 
of the same coin. In the actual process of comparison 
we often ignore the opposition, difference, dissimilarity 
when finding identity, sameness, similarity and vice 
versa. In language, comparison can be encoded into all 
kinds of comparative constructions including simile and 
metaphor. In our life, through comparison with things, we 
can distinguish and recognize them, by finding various 
relations between them; through comparison with others, 
we enjoy dominance over others and bias again others, 
stepping into conservatism and standstill; meanwhile, we 
can find our own shortcomings and keep an open mind, 
leading to competition and progress. With comparison, we 
seek common ground and reserve difference so that we 
have friends, meanwhile we get rid of dissidents and have 
enemies; with comparison, we unite or split, even slip into 
fighting and killing….
3.   THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
M E TA P H O R I C A L  T H I N K I N G  A N D 
COMPARISON
By reassessing the traditional views of metaphor, we 
find that the traditional views have their own weakness 
which lies in the lopsided focus on only one of the 
thinking links in the process of generating metaphor. The 
interaction theory describes the dynamic characteristic 
of two thoughts active together in metaphor. Although 
conceptual metaphors emphasize systematic mappings 
across conceptual domains, the mapping in CMT is 
unidirectional, and there is no interaction in a real sense. 
CMT concentrates on the projection or mapping function, 
but it is only a thinking link of the metaphorical thinking. 
Compared with BT, CMT is less comprehensive, and BT 
provides us with a more dynamic picture: mappings in 
the typical four mental spaces are multidirectional; all 
the spaces interact wither each other and the interaction 
is really realized. Through the study of CMT and BT, 
we find that in the process of metaphorical thinking 
the thinking links of mapping and blending should 
be included. But what makes the blending happens? 
What is the prime power which leads to the conceptual 
integration? We cannot find the answer in BT. All that 
make the conceptual blending work is comparison 
cognition without which no blending happens at all. 
On the basis of the previous analysis of metaphorical 
thinking, we find that metaphorical thinking is a dynamic 
process consisting of a series of thinking links which are 
an organic whole. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that the essence of 
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind 
of thing in terms of another. But this kind of asymmetry 
can be considered as a special comparison, thus we can 
say in fact the essence of comparison is in a fully-fledged 
sense understanding and experiencing one kind of thing 
in terms of another. According to Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English (1995), metaphor is regarded as a 
way of describing something by comparing it to something 
else that has similar qualities, without using the words 
“like” or “as”. Contemporary theorists treat comparison 
as the basic process underlying metaphor comprehension 
(Glucksberg & Keysar, 1993, p.422). For example, simile 
is usually treated as an explicit comparison between two 
things of unlike nature that share something in common, 
using a marker such as “like” or “as”, for instance, “My 
son is like a teddy bear”. In contrast, metaphor is often 
viewed as an implicit comparison between two things of 
different nature that have something in common, using the 
expressions like “A is B” (My son is a teddy bear), “BA” 
(my teddy bear son), or simply “B” (my teddy bear). 
From the discussion above we can see that comparison 
cognition is more comprehensive than metaphorical 
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thinking, that is, comparison cognition incorporates 
metaphorical thinking. Without comparison, no metaphor 
or metaphorical thinking exists. 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, metaphor in language is only a superficial 
linguistic phenomenon behind which it is metaphorical 
thinking that works; metaphor in language is only the 
result and the manifestation of metaphorical thinking; 
metaphorical thinking is a way of thinking with a dynamic 
process consisting of certain cognitive links any of which 
cannot be lopsidedly emphasized and any of which cannot 
be neglected; but we should know that all that keeps 
metaphorical thinking operating is the meta-cognition―
comparison.
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